





Determinants of World Demand for U.S. Corn Seeds:  
The Role of Trade Costs 
 





The United States is a large net exporter of corn seeds. Seed trade, including that of 
corn, has been expanding, but its determinants are not well understood. This paper 
econometrically investigates the determinants of world demand for U.S. corn seeds with a 
detailed analysis of trade costs impeding export flows to various markets, including costs 
associated with distance, tariffs, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations. The 
analysis relies on an explicit specification of derived demand for seed by foreign corn 
producers, estimated based on data from 48 countries for the years 1989 to 2004. An SPS 
count variable is incorporated as a shifter in the unit cost of seeds faced by foreign users. A 
sample selection framework is used to account for the large presence of zero trade flows. All 
trade costs matter and have had a negative impact on U.S. corn seed exports. Tariffs matter 
most, followed by distance and SPS measures.  
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 1. Introduction 
The U.S. commercial seed market is the world’s largest, with an estimated annual value 
exceeding $6 billion per year in the late 1990s, followed by those of China and Japan. Over 
the past decade, the U.S. seed market has been growing in quantity and value, particularly for 
major field crops such as corn, soybeans, cotton, and wheat, which constitute two-thirds of 
the commercial seed market in the United States (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006). 
Seed trade has been an integral part of this market expansion. The United States is a net and 
large exporter of corn seed for planting. The U.S. corn seed export value grew from 
approximately US$68.5 million in 1989 to $174 million in 2004. Italy, Mexico, Canada, 
France, and Spain are the largest importers of U.S. corn seed. Together, these countries 
accounted for approximately 60 percent of total U.S. corn seed exports in 2004.
1 However, 
seed trade is arguably underdeveloped with much potential to expand, especially in 
developing countries (McGee, 1998). Only 10 percent of total U.S. commercial seed goes to 
developing countries such as India and China. These two countries represent large potential 
seed markets, along with Brazil and Argentina (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004).  
The use of standards and technical regulations as instruments of commercial policy 
in world agri-food trade has been rising, as tariff and quota barriers continue to decline and 
as consumers demand safer agri-food products (Beghin, 2008; Henson and Wilson, 2005). 
Among non-tariff measures, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and technical 
barriers to trade (TBTs) are of increasing importance as impediments to, and sometimes 
facilitators of, agri-food trade (Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni, 2008; and Moenius, 2006).  
Despite the substantial body of work analyzing the impact of standards and technical 
                                                 
1 On a regional basis, North America (36 percent), Western Europe (32 percent), Asia (11 
percent), other European countries (6 percent), and South America (4 percent) accounted 
for 89 percent of the total quantity of U.S. exports in 2004. 
 
 -  1 - regulations on agricultural and food trade, little is known about seed trade determinants. 
Seed trade policies have not attracted much attention from economists, although seed 
scientists have raised concerns about SPS policies (Rohrbach, Minde, and Howard, 2003; 
and McGee, 1998). The U.S. seed industry faces significant problems satisfying SPS 
regulations because of increasing concerns about seed safety, stricter SPS requirements in 
trade, competitiveness in export markets, and, occasionally, protectionism.  
There is a large literature on the analysis of TBTs and SPS measures, including 
Anderson, McRae, and Wilson (2001); Beghin and Bureau (2001); Deardorff and Stern 
(1998); and Maskus and Wilson (2001). Henson and Wilson (2005) provide a comprehensive 
discussion of these and other earlier contributions. Cipollina and Salvatici (2007) review 
more recent developments on this topic. Recent analyses include Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster 
(2008); Peterson and Orden (2008); Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006); and Yue and Beghin 
(2009). Conspicuously absent in this SPS literature are explicit analyses of seed trade 
determinants and the impact of associated SPS regulations. This void is surprising because 
seeds are well-known vectors of invasive pests and species propagation. Accordingly, SPS 
measures have been extensively used in world seed trade in order to mitigate the 
introduction of exotic species, pests, and diseases, and to limit risks to human and animal 
health. Examples include quarantines, inspections, tests, certificates, fumigation, and outright 
bans.  
This paper fills this gap and addresses the following questions: What does actually 
determine seed trade among a list of presumed relevant factors (relative seed price, corn 
output, tariff, transportation cost, and SPS policies), and what is their relative importance? 
These are pertinent research questions, which lead to a formal elucidation of seed trade and 
its policy determinants. To estimate the factors determining world demand for U.S. seed 
 -  2 - corn exports, we develop a parsimonious seed export demand model and use it for an 
econometric investigation of world demand for U.S. corn seeds. The empirical analysis relies 
on a newly constructed data set covering major corn and silage producing countries and their 
trade policies (tariffs and SPS measures), which are faced by U.S. seed exporters. The 
frequency measure of SPS policies is based on the EXCERPT (Export Certification Project 
Demonstration) regulation database collected for the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), by Purdue University.  
Our investigation relies on a sectoral gravity-equation-type model. An original feature 
of our setup is that the model is grounded in intermediate demand rather than final demand 
as are most other gravity models. Many agricultural products are indeed intermediate inputs 
used in other industries, and thus our specification is likely to be of interest for other 
agricultural trade applications. The applied trade literature has neglected this simple but 
important point on the differentiation of intermediate and final demands (see also Ghazalian 
et al. (2007) for a related intermediate demand approach). We find that trade costs are 
important determinants of seed export demand: tariffs, SPS regulations, and distance 
negatively affect U.S. corn seed export demand.  
 
2. A Gravity Equation for Imported Seed Demand 
As in many gravity models, we use the simple constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
structure to incorporate the intermediate demand for corn seed in corn production and 
eventually to calculate the tariff equivalent estimate of SPS regulations. The significant 
departure is that the CES applies to production rather than to final consumer preferences. 
Taking a dual approach to the specification of this technology, the cost function for corn 
production derived from a CES production function can be written as follows:  
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where  j Q  is corn production for country j;   is the price paid by corn producers of 
country j for their seed corn sourced in country i; 
ij W
jk R  is the price of the kth non-seed input 
used in country j;  σ  is a parameter that determines the degree of substitutability of the 
inputs; and θi  and μ jk  are technology productivity parameters associated with the various 
inputs used. Note that we assume that the productivity parameters of the seed input are the 
same in all countries, although seeds sourced in different countries can have different 
productivity. With that we try to capture, somewhat roughly, the fact that origin-
differentiated seeds may differ in quality and may be imperfect substitutes. On the other 
hand, the μ jk  parameters associated with non-seed inputs are allowed to differ across 
countries, and thus we do allow for some heterogeneity in the technology for final corn 
production. 




















Seed input prices at destination j can be written as 
(3)  ,   = ij i ij WW T
where   is the export unit price (FOB) of seed corn sourced in country i and   is the 
trade cost factor (also known as trade resistance) that reflects the impacts of tariffs, distance, 
and SPS regulations affecting the price of seed corn from country i and landed in country j. 
By using equation (3), the seed import demand in each country can be expressed as 
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 -  4 - where  j c  is the unit cost function for corn production defined as 
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Demand equations for non-seed inputs could similarly be derived from (1). But in 
our application we will not have data on them, and so we work with a specialized 
formulation that allows us to sidestep the modeling of their explicit impacts. Specifically, to 
proceed we will assume a competitive structure in final corn production, which justifies the 
constant return to scale (CRTS) assumption implicit in our CES specification. In a 
competitive equilibrium, therefore, the unit production cost  j c  will equal the expected 
output price, i.e., the expected corn price in country j. Furthermore, we do not have data on 
seed imports from all destinations, but we do have detailed data on export of U.S. corn 
seeds. So, in what follows we focus on trade in corn seed coming from a single source (the 
United States). 
2.1. A model for U.S. corn seed exports 
Because we consider seed sourced in the Unites States only, in what follows we simplify the 
notation and drop the subscript i  that denotes the source. To make the foregoing model 
operational, we also need to be specific on the formulation of the trade resistance factor. We 
write this factor as 
(6)  ( )( ) ( ) 11 1
β γ
τ =+ + + j jj j TS D , 
where  j T is the trade resistance factor, in country j, toward seed imports from the United 
States; τ j  is the (ad valorem) trade tax on seed corn levied by country j;  j S  is a variable 
capturing the effects of SPS regulation in country j (which we will represent as the count of 
 -  5 - SPS measures that apply to U.S. corn seed exports to country j);
2  j D  is the distance from the 
United States to country  j; and β  and γ  are coefficients that parameterize the effects of 
SPS variables and distance into tariff factor equivalent effects. More specifically, to measure 
the SPS effect we use a frequency measure at the commodity market level, a count of SPS 
regulations affecting U.S. corn seeds. Our model embeds this measure in a cost factor and 
posits that the cost factor increases in the SPS count to capture its incidence. 
With the foregoing parameterization, the import of U.S. corn seed in country  j can 
be written as  
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where, again, we have dropped the origin subscript (so that, for example, W  represents the 




3. Empirical Formulation 
The model is estimated with a sample of M observations of U.S. corn seed exports going to 
 countries. Our empirical model is the log transformation of equation  n (7), leading to the 
following specification: 
                                                 
2 The count variable is, admittedly, a crude indicator. A better proxy would aggregate the SPS 
measures weighted by their cost incidence. The lack of systematic information on the 
associated cost of each SPS measure rules out the preferred aggregation. 
3 It is readily shown that a share equation version of (7) would include a multilateral trade 
resistance term, thereby coming closest in spirit to recent gravity equation investigations as it 
includes a multilateral trade resistance term (e.g., Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni, 2008). A 
disadvantage of such a formulation is that the model is nonlinear in the parameters, and for 
that reason we do not pursue it further as a vehicle for estimating the structural parameters 
of the model. 
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where   and  1,2,..., = tM 1,2,..., = j n, the coefficients αi  are related to the structural 
parameters as  0 ln( ) α θ = ,  1 α βσ = , and  2 α γσ = , and   is an error term that is assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed, so that observations over all destinations can be 
pooled. 
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3.1. Heteroskedasticity and the “zeros” problem 
Two econometric issues that have been recognized to affect gravity-type of models 
estimations are those of heteroskedasticity and zero values for the left-hand-side (LHS) 
variable. Heteroskedasticity in the error term is suspected when the magnitude of the 
residuals appear proportional to the regression function, the latter being a common property 
of empirical models in this area. In equation (8), on the other hand, following a common 
practice in applied econometrics, we allow for some proportionality between errors and 
trade values by, implicitly, postulating a multiplicative error structure for the model in (7). 
The error term itself, of course, is assumed to have a constant variance. An alternatively 
approach, advocated by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and gaining some popularity, relies on the 
so-called pseudo Poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation method. This approach 
estimates the model in levels as in equation (7), with a multiplicative error term and the 
additional assumption that the conditional variance is proportional to the conditional mean. 
The claim is that PPML is robust to heteroskedastic errors. 
A distinct problem is that of the LHS variable taking on zero values for a sizeable 
portion of our data set (about 30 percent of the observations). This “zeros problem” 
presents an immediate challenge for the LHS transformation used in the log-linear model of 
equation (8). Martin and Pham (2008) and Burger, van Oort and Linders (2009) provide a 
 -  7 - taxonomy and a brief review of the relevant literature and discuss a number of estimation 
strategies that have been used in this setting. Two common ways of dealing with this 
problem, in the context of the log-linear model in (8), are: (i) replace zero trade values by a 
small (arbitrary) number, so as to make the log transformation admissible; or (ii) drop all 
observation with zero values (i.e., estimated the structural parameters with a truncated 
sample). The PPML estimation of (the stochastic version of) model (7), on the other hand, 
can readily admit zero observations for the LHS variable, and that is another reason why it is 
being advocated as a reasonable model estimation strategy.  
All these methods are somewhat unsatisfactory in our context because zero values 
for the dependent variables here represent true absence of trade, rather than missing 
observations, and as such are themselves very much in need of explanation. Such a need is 
ignored by approaches that rely on the truncated sample of positive trade flows only, for 
example. Similarly, using the full data sample with the log-linear model in (8) (and the 
arbitrary replacement of zeros by a small number) or the PPML estimation of the model in 
levels (the stochastic version of (7)), does not address this issue either because, essentially, it 
treat all zeros equally. But in fact, some zeros might reflect cases that are just at or near the 
margin where countries are ready to trade. Clearly, such zeros would have a high probability 
to turn into actual trade and could be modeled as arising from the same process generating 
the observations with the positive trade volume. In contrast, other zero observations might 
be associated with high trade costs and thus possess a low probability to turn into positive 
trade. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, a large number of zero observations in the data 
 -  8 - can be problematic with the PPML approach which can suffer from biased estimates as 
shown by Martin and Pham (2008) and Burger, van Oort, and Linders (2009).
 4 
A natural way to handle zero observations in our setting is the sample-selection 
framework originated with Heckman (1979). As discussed later, this is our preferred 
approach, because it allows us to identify the impact of changes in exogenous variables on 
both the likelihood of trade (which we interpret as the “extensive margin”) and the existing 
volume of trade (which we interpret as the “intensive margin”).  We apply this estimation 
procedure to the log-linear model of equation (8). Let  t y  denote the vector of the LHS 
variables at time t corresponding to the trade equation (8), and let   be the corresponding 
trade indicator variable that takes on value one if positive trade is observed, and value zero if 
no trade is observed. These observable variables are related to two latent variables that 
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Finally, the observables of the model are related to these latent variables as follows: 
0 = tt yy  
if   and   otherwise; and 
0 0 > t z 0 = t y 1 = t z  if  , 
0 0 > t z 0 = t z  otherwise. Heckman’s (1979) 
procedure to get consistent estimates in this setting relies on a two-step approach, but given 
the normality assumption a consistent maximum likelihood estimator is readily possible 
                                                 
4 Zero-inflated Poisson regression could be used but it would leave the sample selection 
issue unaddressed. 
 
 -  9 - (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). 
 
4. Data Description 
A summary of the data is presented in table 1. The dataset is available from the authors. The 
U.S. seed corn export data are based on Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States 
(FATUS) from the USDA, which reports both value and volume. Under FATUS, volume is 
derived from value divided by the unit value of the largest seed category. We found some 
irregularities in the volume data reported in FATUS. Hence, we transformed the seed export 
value (US$) into quantities (metric tons) using the U.S. seed corn price in respective years as 
the average export unit value. This step provides quantity data that are consistent with the 
value data and that are quality adjusted, as the export volume is expressed in the same 
volume unit for every country. The U.S. seed corn quantities and prices are from the 
Economic Research Service (ERS), USDA. Annual seed corn production in the United 
States is calculated by adding total exports of U.S. seeds to the estimated total domestic 
(U.S.) use of seeds.
5 Annual U.S. domestic use of seed is assumed to be equal to corn 
planted acres times the seed rate as assumed by USDA. Corn planted area for all purposes is 
taken from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Agricultural Statistics Board, 
USDA. Average seeding rate per acre for corn is based on data from Cropping Practices 
surveys and the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), ERS, USDA. The U.S. 
corn seed use data are by calendar year. 
The seed export data are based on the calendar year. We concentrate on 1989 to 
2004 because of the limited export data availability in FATUS. Our final country sample 
                                                 
5 When estimating trade share by country, we compute shares based on total seed use for 
countries included in the sample, and hence shares do add up to one. 
 
 -  10 - consists of 48 countries based on the following criteria. This sample was selected based on 
an average minimum corn production of 1 million metric tons (mmt) per year, including 
seed corn and forage, during the time period of the study. Although its corn production is 
smaller than 1 mmt, Australia was added to the sample because it has very restrictive corn 
seed regulations (a formal ban except for non commercial corn seed imports) and  hence 
adds across-country variation in the SPS count variable combined to across-country 
variation in other covariates since Australia’s applied tariff is zero. Total world corn 
production and each country’s corn production are based on the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations FAOSTAT.  
The FAOSTAT provides production data on Seed Maize (HS code: 1005) as well as 
Maize for Forage and Silage (HS code: 1214.90). Growers buy hybrid corn seed to produce 
silage just as they would to produce corn for other purposes. We found inconsistencies 
between large seed net imports and small corn outputs reported under HS 1005 in some 
countries in the FAOSTAT data. Notably, we found that Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the Netherlands have sizeable imports of corn seeds but no significant seed maize 
production in the FAOSTAT data. Most of these countries use corn for silage instead of 
maize. Given these facts, we account for the corn production for silage as being relevant for 
the overall demand for seed corn. To aggregate these two types meaningfully, we use 8 
bushels of grain maize per one ton of silage to get units in green maize physical equivalent. 
Corn production data are by calendar year. Our original country sample consisted of 54 
countries. We deleted Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and the Russian federation for which 
we found irregularities (e.g., wide unexplainable swings) in corn production data that could 
not be reconciled using other data sources. We also deleted Malawi and Nigeria, for which 
data were incomplete. 
 -  11 - As noted earlier, in our framework the expected producer price of corn is assumed 
to approximate the (unobserved) unit cost of corn seed production under the assumption of 
perfect competition in corn production and constant return to scale (unit cost=marginal 
cost=expected price). Expected prices are, of course, not observable. Notionally, they 
embed available information at the time expectations are formed, and empirical models for 
expected prices range from full rational expectation formulations to naïve expectation 
models. The simple model we use postulates an information set that includes the previous-
period U.S. price (i.e., the most recent price pertaining to the most important market) and a 
time trend (to capture secular movements in the price of interest). Specifically, we 
approximate the expected price in any one country as the fitted values of a regression of 
observed corn prices of that country on the one-period-lagged U.S. corn price and a linear 
time trend. The current producer price is by calendar year and based on the FAOSTAT. 
Tariffs applied to U.S.-sourced corn seeds are based on World Bank’s World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database (see Table 7 in the Data Appendix). Tariff data 
are currently limited to 1996-2004 in WITS. Hence, we found some pre-1996 data from the 
Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database and Agricultural Market Access 
Database (AMAD). We use whatever data are available for 1989-1995 in TRAINS and 
AMAD and backtrack to 1989 assuming the same value for missing information. Tariff data 
are by calendar year and, although they are expressed in ad valorem form, include all tariffs. 
WITS and TRAINS are consistent for overlapping years since WITS originate from 
TRAINS raw data.  There were very few overlapping data for tariffs across TRAINS and 
AMAD sources; hence, no inconsistencies were found between these two sources. Tariffs in 
most countries exhibit flat or decreasing ad valorem tariffs with the exception of Korea, 
Hungary, and Poland.  In Korea and Hungary, there is a strong increase tariffs in 1996, 
 -  12 - which then decrease in subsequent years. In Poland, the applied tariff increases first in 1996 
and then again in 2001. 
Direct air distance between the U.S. and the major commercial city of each country 
is based on Hengeveld’s World Distance Tables, which are widely used in gravity equations 
and available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR) database. For each country, one airport has been selected as the major air terminal 
from the International Air Transport Association Guide on the basis of importance in 
international passenger and good traffic. For most countries, the name of the airport is 
identical to the name of the nearest large city in order to use the known geographical 
latitudes and longitudes of these cities for calculating air distances. 
The number of SPS regulations imposed by the importing country is based on data 
from the Export Certification Project Demonstration (EXCERPT) database maintained at 
Purdue University on behalf of USDA APHIS. The SPS regulations for each country are 
updated in 2006 by the EXCERPT. However, older regulations starting from 1996 are 
reported in the EXCERPT archives. We look at phytosanitary certificates, import permit, 
and field inspection as well as some other demanding regulatory requirements, including 
seed testing, post-entry testing, and quarantine. Virtually all countries require a phytosanitary 
certificate, except Canada. Australia and China have a seed import ban, although China has 
imported a small amount of seeds in recent years. Some seed lines have to be imported by 
China to initiate local production. Hence, the Chinese trade ban has not been as tight in 
recent years, although seed imports remain very small relative to the size of the Chinese corn 
sector. We use a large number (50) for the SPS count (prohibitive SPS compliance cost) for 
China and Australia to mimic an SPS count equivalent to the prohibitive policies.  
Over time, most countries have streamlined their SPS regulations. Argentina and 
 -  13 - Chile have a low SPS count. The most radical simplifications have occurred in some Eastern 
European countries, which are now members of the European Union (EU). Notably, in the 
last 10 years, Hungary started with an SPS count of 68, streamlined it to 30 in 2003, and 
eventually adopted EU regulations (SPS count of 3) with EU accession in 2004. South 
Africa, India, and Indonesia also simplified their regulations by removing all SPS 
requirements. Egypt, Zimbabwe, and, surprisingly, Brazil have very high SPS count (18 
requirements). The Brazilian case is puzzling, as the country is a large corn producer that 
would benefit from accessing better seeds.  
 
5. Econometric Results 
As noted earlier, the sample-selection framework of equations (9)-(10) represents our 
favorite estimation strategy although, for comparison, we will also report the results of two 
single-equation estimation procedures: OLS on the log-linear equation in (8) (where zeros on 
the LHS are replaced by 0.1); and, the PPML estimation of the stochastic version of the 
model in (7). The results of these two estimation procedures are reported in Table 2. OLS 
on the log-linear model and the PPML model produce similar results as far as the sign and 
significance of the estimated effects, but the estimated magnitude of these effects is quite 
different. In particular, the PPML approach suggests a larger response to the SPS variable, 
and a lower response to distance. Another feature of these results that is readily apparent is 
the difference between the estimates based on the full sample and those based on the 
truncated sample (positive trade only). This is so even for the PPML approach, which 
typically is presumed to be more robust to truncation. Hence, it appears that selection bias 
might be a relevant issue, further motivating the Heckman sample-selection approach. 
  Table 3 reports results for sample-selection specification in (9)-(10) estimated by 
 -  14 - maximum likelihood (ML), which produces asymptotically efficient estimators. Notice that 
both the selection and the trade equations depend on the trade cost components (tariff, 
distance, and SPS). In addition, a time trend as appears in the selection model but not in the 
trade equation. Such a variable is meant to capture other secular effects on the evolution of 
trade patterns that are not explained by our limited set of exogenous variables and, in 
principle, could be advocated for either equation in (9). But the exclusionary restriction that 
we have adopted is meant to aid identification (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004).
6 The 
selection equation has all parameters significant with the expected sign. The negative signs 
on the estimated parameters of the trade cost components in the selection model indicate 
that the likelihood to trade diminishes as the trade cost factors increase. Also, the positive 
sign on the estimated parameter of the time trend in the selection model indicates that the 
likelihood to trade has increased over time, consistent with trade integration.  
  The implied structural parameter estimates are reported in the lower part of Table 3. 
These structural parameter estimates are significantly different from zero and similar in 
magnitude to the results reported in Table 2 for the estimation of (8) with the truncated 
sample. The estimated correlation coefficient  ˆ ρ  is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating a sample selection bias in the data. A comparison of OLS parameter estimates for 
the log-linear model with the full sample in Table 2 with the ML estimates in Table 3 
indicates the selectivity bias that affects the OLS method with full sample. In particular, 
consider the change in the estimates for distance and SPS from OLS to the ML estimates. 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, given the normality assumption, the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio 
suffices for identification even when the elements of   and   are the same. But such an 
identification strategy is often criticized, and the exclusion of one variable (time trend in our 
case) is common for identification purposes. In response to a referee’s inquiry, we looked at 
the impact of replacing the time trend with a set of time dummy variables in the selection 
equation, and that had virtually no effect on the estimated structural parameters.  
t H t L
 -  15 - The coefficient for distance decreases from 0.4157 in OLS to 0.2312 in ML. The coefficient 
for tariffs decreases from 2.1365 in OLS to 1.4885 in ML. On the other hand, the coefficient 
for SPS increases from 0.3421 in OLS to 0.4769 in ML. In summary, the impact of distance 
and tariffs is overestimated and the impact of SPS is underestimated when failing to correct 
for the selectivity bias in the data.  
  Although the sample selection approach is popular in empirical analysis, marginal 
effects are often misinterpreted when a regressor enters into both selection and trade 
equations. In this case, when  ˆ 0 ρ ≠ , it is incorrect to interpret the estimated parameters of 
the trade equation shown in Table 3 as the marginal effect. Even if one were interested only 
in the conditional impact of a regressor (that is, conditional on trade taking place), in 
addition to the direct impact as per the estimated coefficients one still needs to account for 
an indirect effect. This is apparent when one recalls that, for observations for which trade 
takes place, the conditional mean of the trade equation from (9) satisfies (see, e.g., Davidson 
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Furthermore, when a regressor affects both the intensity of trade and the probability that 
 -  16 - trade takes place, the total unconditional impact is arguably the effect of interest. Following 
Hoffmann and Kassouf (2005) such an unconditional effect can be written as 
(13)
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where  () 1( t L ) t L ψ ψ Φ= − Φ −  is the probability that trade takes place. Hence, to find the 
unconditional effect of a regressor that affects both the intensity of trade and the probability 
that trade takes place, the conditional effect in (12) needs to be augmented by 
ψ λ ∂ = kt k t R ∂Φ ln
                                                
. 
  The conditional and unconditional marginal effects, evaluated at the sample mean of 
the observations used to fit the model, are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4. As noted 
earlier, we relate these two marginal effects to the intensive and extensive margins to trade. 
Specifically, the conditional marginal effects represent the elasticities of trade given that trade 
takes place (intensive margin). The unconditional marginal effects represent the elasticities of 
trade for all countries, trading and not trading (both intensive and extensive margins).
7 The 
estimated unconditional marginal effects for the trade cost components are larger in absolute 
value than the conditional effects, because the former takes into account both extensive and 
intensive margins, whereas the latter only measures the intensive margin. 
  The tariff factor has the largest marginal effect, followed by distance and SPS factors. 
The striking result is the importance of the distance factor on both trade margins. The 
 
7 As noted by a reviewer, our implicit definition of the extensive margin is somewhat 
restrictive. More generally, new trade (the extensive margin) can arise because of the 
emergence of new destinations (Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006), new exported varieties 
(Hummels and Klenow, 2005), or the participation of new firms on export markets 
(Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). Because our model considers the same product (no 
new varieties), and our industry-wide modeling does not identify firm-level activity, we can 
narrowly interpret the change in the probability to trade as the change in the extensive 
margin, whereas the change in existing trade is the change in the intensive margin. 
 
 -  17 - estimated parameters in the first column of Table 3 provide a poor gauge of the total 
marginal effect of the respective explanatory variables on trade. 
  Distance has the strongest effect on the extensive margin (likelihood to trade) as 
measured by the difference between the unconditional and conditional marginal effects. This 
suggests that transportation cost (as proxied by distance) is the major trade cost inhibitor of 
the emergence of new trade followed by tariffs and SPS measures and policies decreasing 
these costs associated with distance would presumably have a large impact. However, at the 
intensive margin, tariffs matter the most followed by distance and SPS measures.  
  In summary, the results show that trade costs do matter considerably in corn seed 
trade. Tariff factors have the largest effect, followed by the cost factor reflecting 
geographical distance, and last, the factor for SPS regulations, provided that sample selection 
bias is properly addressed. Gauging the effects of trade costs based on the estimation of the 
intensive margin alone would be quite misleading. When properly computed using marginal 
effects derived from the sample selection model, the magnitude and ranking of the impacts 
of these trade costs on seed trade differ from the estimated regression coefficients on which 
they are based. The marginal effects are much larger in absolute value than the associated 
coefficients and reveal the relative importance of cost associated with distance.  
  We also note that our responses to distance are within the range of estimates 
reviewed by Disdier and Head (2008). Average tariffs on the U.S. seed trade have been 
moderate (10 percent in our sample) over the last two decades. Yet, the high response of 
corn seed exports to tariffs suggests that tariffs remain an important barrier that could be 
further reduced. Removing the remaining tariffs evaluated (in 2004) would increase existing 
(2004) seed trade by roughly 12%, specifically 11% through intensified trade and 1% 
through new trade. These estimates are obtained by applying the conditional marginal effect 
 -  18 - to the removal of positive ad valorem tariffs in countries with positive trade and by 
computing the extensive margin effect of removing the positive tariff in countries with no 
trade and applying it to the average observed trade level for 2004. The small effect on new 
trade occurs because many countries with positive tariffs have positive trade already and 
several countries with no trade have zero tariffs.  
  SPS regulations also pose a significant barrier to U.S. seed exports but unlike for 
tariffs, a complete unilateral removal may not be beneficial as externalities could occur in 
absence of SPS regulations. Nevertheless, in most case, a few SPS measures would suffice, 
such as a SPS certificate, eventual field inspection, or occasional treatments, focusing on the 
few relevant pests for each importing country. These few measures would be sufficient to 
eradicate most if not all vectors of externalities for corn seeds (Mcgee, 1998). For the sake of 
estimating a trade effect from rationalizing SPS measures, we conjecture that five SPS 
measures would be sufficient to maintain the SPS integrity of the seeds to all destinations 
and compute the associated trade effects from removing SPS policies in excess of this 
reference count in 2004. This approach is somewhat arbitrary but provides an order of 
magnitude to a potential rationalization of SPS policies in export markets. As for tariffs, we 
apply the implied proportional reduction of SPS measures to the intensive margin for 
countries with positive trade and then apply the proportional reduction in SPS count to the 
extensive margin for countries with no trade, weighted by the average trade level prevailing 
in 2004. The total trade expansion effect of rationalizing SPS regulations is nearly 8.8% of 
which 0.4% comes from the extensive margin (i.e., new trade). 
8 
  In sum, although the extensive margin is a critical component of the unconditional 
                                                 
8 If only three SPS measures were necessary to maintain the SPS integrity of the seeds, then 
the total expansion of trade would be 11.4 %, of which 0.7% through the extensive margin. 
 -  19 - (total) trade margin, trade expansion from tariff liberalization and SPS policy rationalization 
would come principally through intensification of existing trade rather than from new export 
destinations.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The U.S. seed market is the largest in the world and is expanding. Seed trade has been an 
important part of this expansion. Despite these facts, seed trade and its determinants remain 
a somewhat neglected topic in agricultural trade research. We fill this gap with an analysis of 
trade costs associated with U.S. corn seed trade. We develop a parsimonious seed export 
demand model with a sound conceptual foundation based on derived demand in production, 
accounting for major trade costs including transportation, tariff factors, and the cost of SPS 
measures affecting seed trade flows. We use a count of SPS regulations affecting U.S. corn 
seeds embedded in a cost factor and posit that the cost factor increases in the SPS count.  
We estimate the export demand equation based on a log-linear specification of seed 
export levels and using Heckman’s sample selection model. The major empirical findings of 
the study are that all the trade costs have a statistically significant and negative impact on 
U.S. corn seed exports. The sample selection procedure addresses the large number of zero-
trade observations in the data and is motivated by evidence of sample selection bias with 
alternative methods. The sample selection procedure also allows computing extensive and 
intensive margins of trade when trade costs components are altered. Based on marginal 
effects computed from the sample selection model, the decreasing order of importance for 
trade costs is first tariffs, followed by distance, and then SPS regulations.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. The research 
question addressed here, namely, the determinants of seed export demand, appears to have 
 -  20 - been ignored to date in the economic literature. Further, we derive a gravity-like approach to 
export demand based on derived demand in production unlike in other applications of the 
gravity model to agricultural trade based on final demand. Lastly, the dataset collected for 
the investigation is also novel in its SPS component and the development of the SPS count 
variable.  
Our analysis has relevant policy and political economy implications. Trade policy 
barriers matter much in trade costs. Tariffs on agricultural goods remain important, although 
they have somewhat decreased with the Uruguay round of the World Trade Organization 
and with regional trade agreements. Tariffs on seed trade have been moderate (an average of 
10 percent in our sample). Nevertheless, the high response of corn seed exports to tariffs 
suggests that tariffs remain an important barrier that could be further reduced. We estimate 
that the removal of remaining tariffs would induce a 12% increase in U.S. corn seed trade. 
  The importance of trade costs induced by SPS regulations raises the issue of sorting 
which of these regulations are legitimate, that is, science based, and which are not and could 
be eliminated or challenged using the WTO dispute settlement body.  We consider a 
rationalization of “excess” SPS measures in countries ridden by many SPS policies. We find 
that such rationalization would increase trade by nearly 9%,  mostly through intensification 
of trade.  In the data presentation we also noted the important policy development in the 
enlarged European Union. The streamlining of SPS measures among EU-27 members has 
facilitated much trade expansion in the last decade. 
When looking at these two policies together, the political economy of SPS measures 
in seed markets does not seem to fit the traditional argument of SPS and tariffs being policy 
substitutes in rent-seeking activities. Both have been significantly decreased with a few 
exceptions for applied tariffs. SPS measures have not risen and substituted for falling tariffs 
 -  21 - through our 1989-2004 time span. The correlation between tariff and SPS is statistically weak 
and does not suggest any strategic interaction from rent-seeking pressures. 
Finally, distance is irreducible of course, but cost associated with distance and 
transportation could be reduced, and could lead to new trade and intensification of existing 
trade.  
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 -  25 - Table 1.      Data Summary 
variable Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum Maximum Units 
SPS count S 9.602  14.366  0  68  count   
Distance D 8542.071  3268.792  0  15801  miles   
tariff τ  9.915  39.38  0  357.6  Ad val. (%)   
US Seed use X 14218.292  87492.541 0 653424.5  Metric  tons   
expected unit cost c 175.145 158.317 23.795 1194.178  US$/mt  
US seed price fob W  3644.237 481.886 3082.062 4629.706  US$/mt   
Corn production Q 13572.09  39632.325 57  319692.188 1000  mt   
            
                 Correlation among Variables  
  S  D  τ  X c  W  Q 
SPS count S 1             
Distance D -0.001  1           
tariff τ 0.023  0.240  1         
US Seed use X -0.102  -0.404  -0.040 1       
expected unit cost c -0.067  0.130  0.193 -0.079 1    
US seed price fob W -0.041  0.004  0.086  0.008  -0.061  1   




 -  26 - Table 2.  U.S. Corn Seed Exports: OLS on log-linear model, and PPML model  
 
 
Variable  Estimated structural parameters with: 
 
        Full sample        Truncated sample 
  Log-linear   PPML  Log-linear   PPML 


































(0.2109)    
Elasticity of  












2  (Pseudo R
2 for 
PPML) 
0.2016 0.1877 0.2976 0.1732 
Observations 709 709 490 490 
 
Note:  In the log-linear model with full sample,   jt X  replaced by  0.1 + jt X  when  .  0 = jt X
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
* denotes significant at the 1% level. 
 -  27 - Table 3.  Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of sample selection model 
  Log linear gravity equation specification 
 











* 1.7996  6.7485
* 0.8297 
Time  0.0596
* 0.0134   
( ) ln 1+ j D   -1.6129
* 0.1915  -0.3442
* 0.0657 
() ln 1+ j S   -0.1702
* 0.0559  -0.7098
* 0.1025 
( ) ( ) ln (1 ) τ + jj cW   0.4747
* 0.1236  1.4885
* 0.1703 
Recovered  parameters      
 Distance (γ )    0.2312  0.0465 
 SPS (β )    0.4769  0.0871 
 Elasticity of  
 substitution (σ )    1.4885  0.1703 
ˆ ρ    -0.3645
*
ˆ ω   2.1508
Observations 709  494
Note: Maximized log-likelihood value = -1430.75, and 
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Table 4: Conditional and unconditional marginal effects of trade costs 
 
Variable estimated 











( ) ln 1+ j D   -0.3442 -0.9921 -1.8091 
() ln 1+ j S   -0.7098 -0.7782 -0.8644 
( ) ( ) ln (1 ) τ + jj cW   1.4885 1.6792 1.9194 
a First column from table 2.  
b Because we use log specifications, these effects correspond to elasticities  
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